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A Robust Federated Machine Learning Framework for Security
Analytics in Solar Farms
Abstract

Smart grids face more cyber threats than before with the integration of
photovoltaic (PV) systems. Data-driven based machine learning (ML) methods
have been verified to be effective in detecting attacks in power electronics
devices. However, standard ML solution requires centralized data collection then
processing that is becoming infeasible in more and more applications due to
efficiency issues and increasing data privacy concerns. In this research, we
propose a novel decentralized ML framework for detecting false data injection
(FDI) attacks on solar PV DC/DC and DC/AC converters. The proposed
paradigm incorporates the emerging technology named federated learning (FL)
that enables collaboratively training across devices without sharing raw data. To
the best of our knowledge, this work is the first application of FL for power
electronics in the literature. Extensive experimental results demonstrate that our
approach can provide efficient FDI attack detection for PV systems and aligned
with the trend of critical data privacy regulations.

Introduction
With the rapid integration of renewable energy resources, such as solar
photovoltaic (PV), power grids are encountering more challenges in defending
against cyber-attacks [1], [2]. PV farms are controlled and connected to the
grid via power electronics devices equipped with sensors that may frequently
exchange information with control centers for monitoring and control purposes.
This inevitably creates vulnerabilities in the power grid that adversaries can
exploit, especially when the sensors lack tamper-resistance hardware.
Thus, there is a demand in developing a collaborative ML paradigm for attack
detection in PVs without the need of sharing raw data. To close this gap, we
propose a novel framework incorporating the concept of federated learning
(FL) [3]. We use measurements from voltage and current sensors at the point
of common coupling (PCC) to construct the ML model for detecting FDI
attacks [4] on DC/DC and DC/AC converters in solar farms. Our design
leverages the computational capacity of local sensors and decentralizes the
computing tasks into devices near to where the raw data are generated.
Compared with centralized ML implementation, our FL-based approach
reduces the communication bandwidth consumption. Moreover, only the model
parameters instead of the raw data are shared during the entire process.

Because Client-0’s dataset has a relatively similar amount of abnormal and
normal samples, it takes more time to train the local model compared to other
clients to distinguish the two types of data. We observe that Client-0’s loss value
quickly approaches the same level of performance as the other clients when
more communication rounds are carried out between the clients and the server.

Fig. 1: The proposed FL framework for FDI attack detection
Our design leverages the computational capacity of local sensors and
decentralizes the computing tasks into devices near to where the raw data are
generated. In the proposed framework, as Figure 1 indicates, each sensor first
learns a local model using its private data and then uploads its learned model
parameters to the control center. Upon aggregating the local models from
sensors, the control center fuses the local models and feeds the averaged
model back to the sensors for the next round of updates. After iterating multiple
rounds of local updating and global aggregation, the model training phase
completes when convergence is reached. Finally, the trained model is deployed
at sensors for FDI attack detection.

Results
We designed several experiments to prove the proposed method are feasible.
The dataset we used are the current and voltage sensor readings of the DC/DC
and DC/AC converters in solar farms, labeled with normal or attacked. To
simulate the real-world situation, the experiments were conducted in both IID
and Non-IID scenarios. 90% of the total data is used for training the local
models, and the rest of 10% data is used for testing the global model.

1. How to use machine learning techniques to detect cyber attacks so that
protect solar photovoltaic grid system?
2. Will federated learning technique train a good model without accessing the
raw data?
3. How efficient will this federated learning framework be (in communication
perspective)?

We propose a novel decentralized ML framework for detecting false data
injection (FDI) attacks on solar PV DC/DC and DC/AC converters. The
proposed paradigm incorporates the emerging technology named federated
learning (FL) that enables collaboratively training across devices without
sharing raw data. We use measurements from voltage and current sensors at
the point of common coupling (PCC) to construct the ML model for detecting
FDI attacks on DC/DC and DC/AC converters in solar farms。

Table 1. shows the evaluation results of the global model on the testing set
under IID and Non-IID data distributions together with the centralized
approach. We can see our approach archives the similar level performance
with the centralized model.

Table 2. Communication Cost Comparison
We also tested the communication cost for the FL method and the centralized
method. It is shown that the cost for transmitting the model weights is only
0.35% of sharing the raw data.

Conclusions

Research Question(s)

Materials and Methods

Table 1. Evaluation Results Comparison

We proposed a new FL-based collaborative framework for FDI attack
identification in PV systems. First, we analyzed the FDI attack in solar farms
and presented a centralized ML solution for attack detection. Then, we
incorporated the concept of FL and developed a decentralized approach for
model training without sharing raw data. Experimental results verified that our
paradigm significantly outperforms standard ML implementation in
communication efficiency with preserving data privacy. Besides, our
methodology is highly transferable and can be extended and customized for
other privacy-centric power electronics applications.
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Fig. 2: Training and testing losses of the LSTM model trained
based on the proposed FL paradigm with four clients under
(left) IID and (right) Non-IID data distributions.
Figure 2 demonstrates the loss value changes over each communication for the
training and testing set under ID and Non-IID distributions, respectively. We can
see that our proposed framework is convergent in all experiments. For the
results of the IID scenario in Fig.2(left), the four clients show a similar
convergence behavior as the ratios of abnormal/normal samples are close
across the clients’ local datasets, and each client learns the model comparably.
Note that for the Non-IID situation in Fig.2(right), Client-0 learns slower than the
other clients during the first few communications rounds.
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